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ABSTRACT
Various relations between direct and metalevel stud-
ies of language and mathematics are examined from
an interdisciplinary perspective, in order to sort out
in what way these interactions may be seen as, or lead
to form, a coherent pattern of ideas. After setting up a
rather precise map of this interaction, it is argued that
coherence is necessary besides being possible.
1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Relations between language and mathematics are, in
a broad sense, increasingly in the focus of attention of
recent studies in the philosophy of mathematics as
well as in mathematics education.
In the philosophy of mathematics, two current ten-
dencies may be identified. Both are rooted in the ba-
sic idea that mathematics represents a special form of
language use, according to a more general theory on
how language use is constitutive for structures of ab-
stract meaning, represented by figures as different as
Peirce, Wittgenstein and Vygotsky. The first class of
developments of this idea is diachronic in nature, as
it is based on what is claimed to be historical evidence
for the “dialectical nature” of the special language use
involved in the construction of mathematical mean-
ing; furthermore, it insists that this dialectics can only
be understood as socially situated. At times, this di-
rection approaches what might rather be called a “so-
ciology of mathematics.” Considering it a philosophy
of mathematics, the basic claim seems to be that the
nature of mathematical knowledge can only be stud-
ied indirectly, mainly through the institutions, inter-
personal relations, etc., that are related to the creation
and dissemination of mathematical knowledge. Rep-
resentative accounts are found in (Hersh, 1979),
(Kitcher, 1984), (Tymoczko, 1986), and (Ernest, 1998),
where the philosophical nature of this viewpoint is
also explicitly defended. One characteristic feature of
such an account is that it is deductive, in the sense
that it infers from general beliefs (such as “knowledge
is socially situated”) and related theories (notably so-
ciology and elements of sociolinguistics), to the spe-
cial case of mathematics, accommodating the specific
characteristics of this special case in the general pic-
ture to the extent such specifics are considered at all.
In fact, reference to actual mathematical practice is
typically scarce. Even in (Ernest, 1998), the main such
reference is indirect, namely via Lakatos’ classical
study (1976) of the history of Euler’s polyhedron for-
mula.
The second class of developments is focused on struc-
tural relations (similarities, differences, dependencies,
etc.) between linguistic and mathematical knowledge,
taking as a basis a synchronic, interdisciplinary analy-
sis of actual mathematical and linguistic structures.
The objective of such studies, then, is to shed light on
the nature of mathematical knowledge through its
relations with the (more “commonplace,” but clearly
not completely understood) nature of linguistic
knowledge. It seems fair to say that there are more
claims of such structural relations (which may be
found scattered throughout the literature) than actual,
detailed studies based on linguistic methods and ex-
plicit mathematical content, but at least, we have pres-
ently several examples, and some tentative theoreti-
cal frameworks, cf. (Halliday, 1974), (Pimm, 1987),
(Rotman, 1988), (Walkerdine, 1990), (Winslow, 1998).
Any such theory will, in principle, be inductive in
nature, proceeding from analysis (in a more or less
formal sense) of actual texts (in a broad sense) to gen-
eral hypothesis and claims about patterns and char-
acteristics of mathematical language use. The perspec-
tive of the present paper falls mainly in this second
class.
It seems clear, even from this quick sketch, that the
two viewpoints are not theoretically opposed to each
other; rather does the difference reflect incommensu-
rable views of what constitutes (or perhaps, what is
important in) a theory of knowledge.
Turning now towards mathematics education, the
main theme has been the roles and functions of natu-
ral language in the learning of mathematics, especially
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the mechanisms and the learning potential of discur-
sive interaction in mathematics classrooms and cor-
relations between performance in mathematics learn-
ing and competency in the language of instruction. It
seems clear that such roles, functions and correlations
should be both relevant to, and enlightened by, the
philosophical issues alluded to above. The fact is that
such relations are not studied in depth, especially as
concerns the second of the above-mentioned view-
points on mathematical knowledge.
The aim of this note is to argue that this relation may
be established in a coherent way, while taking seri-
ously into account both mathematics (the centerpiece,
after all!), linguistics (not just folklore beliefs about
“the social nature” of language), the philosophy of
mathematics (as a discipline with certain basic issues
and a long history related to philosophy in general),
and mathematics education (as a young and quite vi-
tal discipline addressing highly important problems
for education in general). As intermediate steps, we
need furthermore to accommodate certain areas of
sociolinguistics and language pedagogy, which are
associated to (and partially derivative of) linguistics
as such.
The main point of our discussion is that leaving out
the full perspective of one of these disciplines could
(and does in some cases) mean turning from “com-
munication oriented theory of mathematical knowl-
edge and learning” to either a very narrow study of
two-sided correlations, or (in the worst case) to inco-
herent, unprofessional gossip.
The reader may wish to consult, at this stage, the fig-
ure in Sec. 7, in order to see at once the coherence of
the first six sections, despite their apparent disparity.
Moreover, the reader only interested in metamath-
ematics (not in learning theory) could omit Sec. 5 and
6, corresponding to the right third of the mentioned
figure.
2. FROM MATHEMATICS TO LINGUISTICS
This is the first and easy part of the story, as it is es-
sentially just to be recalled (not constructed anew);
the way back, from linguistics to (meta)mathematics,
is the difficult part.
The flow of ideas from mathematics to linguistics can
be regarded at two levels, which, after the early days
(Harris, 1970), seem to be increasingly distinct in prac-
tice. The first is similar to the use of mathematical
models in natural science fields, and is the source of
what is called mathematical linguistics. Here, one
studies certain mathematical systems which are, at the
outset, defined in order to model certain aspects of
natural language (typically within syntax). The prob-
lem vis à vis linguistics seems to be that the study of
such models quickly generates interesting questions
and sophisticated techniques, while “applications”
(insights about natural language) become somewhat
secondary. This is of course also the case with several
other “mathematical” disciplines, such as mathemati-
cal physics or mathematical biology. For a readable
introduction to mathematical linguistics, see e.g.
(Gross, 1972).
The second level of influence is less direct in nature.
It can be described as a transfer of methodological
approach (rather than concrete theory), in this case
resulting in a shift from the traditional study of “local
phenomena” (e.g. the historic development of a cer-
tain word or expression) to the study of language as
structures which are amenable to “global” study, much
like (but not as) a mathematical structure. Although
apparently this is a weaker kind of impact, it has been
much more important: first of all, it is crucial in the
rise of modern, structural linguistics. It has also, at
times, been significantly inspired by results and meth-
ods from mathematical linguistics, as in Chomsky’s
famous argument that language structure cannot be
generated from finite evidence alone (Chomsky, 1957,
83).
It goes without saying that the transfer of research
methods among fields which were, traditionally, as
separate as mathematics and linguistics, is neither
harmless nor exempt from controversy. Indeed, it is
highly questionable whether the study of language
can address its most interesting aspects with a rigid
and formal approach inspired by logic and mathemat-
ics (cf. also Sec. 2); this is, by the way, not the claim of
structural linguistics as such. On the other hand, such
an approach has not only given a new and better un-
derstanding of syntax and other parts of formal lan-
guage structure, it has also added a dimension to our
understanding of what research in linguistics and
more generally in the humanities may be.
Incidentally, this second level of influence is not re-
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stricted to the field of linguistics. In fact, structural-
ism, as a general trend in the human sciences, may to
a large extent be regarded as the result of this transfer
of systematic approach from mathematics, see e.g.
(Piaget, 1968) and (Gibson, 1984, B1).
3. LINGUISTICS BROADENING: SOCIOLINGUISTICS AND
LANGUAGE PEDAGOGY
Sociolinguistics may be roughly defined as certain
domains of inquiry in which the study area and meth-
ods of linguistics are extended to embrace wider ar-
eas than the structure of natural language at phrase
level. These extensions happen in different dimen-
sions: to cover natural language use at text level (dis-
course analysis), to analyze human sign systems be-
yond written and spoken natural language (semiol-
ogy), and to study the use of natural language within
various segments of a human society
(“sociolinguistics” in a narrow sense). A well-devel-
oped area, which has affinities with all these aspects
of sociolinguistics as well as with education, is the field
of language pedagogy, in which the subject of study
is the teaching and learning
of natural language (mother
tongue or foreign), cf.
(Stern, 1983) and (Stubbs,
1986), that contain also ref-
erences to work done in
sociolinguistics. A main fact
to observe here is that all of
these extensions have sig-
nificant roots in structural
linguistics and directly or through structural linguis-
tics in the Saussurian view of language as a sign sys-
tem. In particular, they all carry the imprint of struc-
turalism, and, with it, of a more or less direct transfer
of methodology from mathematics. Discourse analy-
sis, being a straightforward extension of grammar in
the traditional sense, clearly confirms this claim, al-
though the structural description may (and does) in
this case exhibit a more pragmatic character. The idea
of sign systems, in which signifieds are more often
than not represented by signifiers of other signs, may
be regarded as a mathematical metaphor from the
structuralist view of mathematics as concerned with
abstract “relation patterns” (Resnik, 1997). The study
of language use which is particular for certain soci-
etal groups may look, at first sight, less subject to such
relations, yet its inevitable need for describing these
particularities (e.g. in terms of syntax or lexicology)
ultimately forces it to interact with structural catego-
ries of natural language (Hudson, 1986). Similar re-
marks apply to the area of language pedagogy, where
the influence of cognitive psychology (e.g. in the
Piagetian sense) only adds further imprint of struc-
turalist approach (in the sense outlined in the intro-
duction).
4. RELATIONS BETWEEN MATHEMATICS AND KNOWLEDGE
ABOUT IT
 After having outlined the flow of ideas from math-
ematics as far as to language pedagogy, we return to
mathematics and begin to look at it from outside; theo-
ries about the nature and structure of mathematics as
a whole (assuming this “whole” makes sense in an
appropriately delimited sense) will be said to belong
to the domain of metamathematics. In particular, this
includes theories which are (at least similar to) math-
ematical theories themselves, such as various forms
of logic, or category theory. It also includes theories
of philosophical nature, to the extent these are con-
cerned with mathematical knowledge. In fact, one has
yet to see an interesting
theory on the foundation of
mathematics which does
not raise philosophical
problems.
The issues considered here
thus ranges from the tech-
nical foundations of the
subject, over its functions in
other fields, to ontic and epistemic questions. A main
torment of such theories seems to be that a credible
solution to one problem often seems to have unac-
ceptable consequences for some of the others; for in-
stance, the various brands of realism offer coherent
ontologies but also harsh difficulties with epistemic
questions, while the theories that regard mathemat-
ics as a social entity seem to be more coherent on
epistemic issues than as regards foundations. What I
would like to do here is to replace the abstract subject
(mathematics) with its appearance in the world, which
is plainly textual (communication about, or using,
mathematics). It appears that many controversial is-
sues, especially as regards ontology and foundations,
arise from the trying to grasp “the thing behind,” the
silent, unarticulated Mathematics behind its manifes-
tations. In this sense, what we are left with could be
said to be of “social” or “human” nature, just as other
❝A main torment of such theories seems to be that
a credible solution to one problem often seems to
have unacceptable consequences for some of the
others...
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communicated realms; but it seems to me that to ac-
cept this is an empty triviality that is controversial only
to the extent one has not abandoned the idea of find-
ing mathematics elsewhere than through mathemat-
ics as encountered in the world. Whether or not there
is such an out-wor(l)dly thing, I think it is legitimate
and even wise to restrict rational inquiry to its comple-
ment.
Settling with this, we have excluded from our per-
spective of metamathematics only certain forms of
realism which claim that mathematical objects have
existence beyond their presence in communication
about mathematics. Notice that this does not neces-
sarily exclude them from being permanent, and, as
far as we can see, even eternal; the universal gram-
mar of human languages is a perfectly assuring anal-
ogy in this respect. On the contrary, having to rely on
invariant properties of a subject which is not explicit
in its articulated forms, seems to me to be of rather
little assurance as regards the stability of the subject.
We are thus left with all foundationalist theories of
this century, and almost all of the relevant analytic
and continental philosophies. Mathematics itself has
limited use in judging between them. Indeed, we
know at least in a certain limited sense (from Gödel’s
work) that no foundational theory will be “proved”
mathematically. However, mathematics is in various
forms is taken into account in each of them although
not in all of them in a way consistent with the picture
we are about to set up. For instance, Brouwer’s “first
act of intuitionism” (intuitionistic mathematics is an
essentially languageless activity of the mind, in
Brouwer, 1981) suggests that this school may fall par-
tially outside the perspective of this paper, but the
main reason is its prescriptive nature, as discussed in
the next section.
5. LINGUISTICS AND METAMATHEMATICS
Metamathematics is inspired from linguistics in nar-
row and in broader ways. In the most literal sense,
the logico-foundational studies of Russell, Gödel,
Tarski and others are certainly a kind of linguistic in-
quiry into formal (mathematical) language in a very
special technical sense. I claim that these studies have
really little to do with linguistics and mathematics in
the plain sense. As concerns linguistics, only few, es-
pecially Montague (1974), have tried to connect theo-
ries of formal languages directly to linguistics in the
usual sense (dealing with natural language), and it
seems to have little or no direct impact on modern
linguistics. Regarding mathematics, the problem is
that the formal languages analyzed in this tradition
are quite different from the way mathematics is com-
municated by mathematicians other than these logi-
cians. Rather than being a descriptive (or naturalis-
tic) account and analysis of mathematical language
use, this field constructs, to a large extent, the language
it analyzes, although with the intention of creating a
more consistent form in which to formulate existing
mathematics. It thus has a prescriptive element which
is quite foreign to linguistic methodology; right or
wrong in language use is relative (to the grammar etc.
of a speech community), not a matter of legislation.
No linguistic theory of natural language (not even that
of Montague) would start by constructing alternative
forms of the language in order to put our understand-
ing of the less perfect original on firm grounds.
The broadened scope of linguistics (Sec. 2), especially
semiology and discourse analysis, offers various
means of interpreting mathematics as language use.
The “semiotics of mathematics” was opened, as a new
perspective, in (Rotman, 1988), while ideas from dis-
course analysis have been influential in recent work
in mathematics education (e.g., Pimm, 1994 and Sfard,
1998). The major question is now: which theories,
among the fairly large and varied assortment avail-
able, are more likely to provide us with tools to make
this interpretation faithful? One popular notion in this
respect has recently been that of metaphor (e.g. Sfard,
1994, Lakoff-N’Òez, 1997), a notion which otherwise
is especially used in the analysis of literary texts. While
this has led to insights regarding the construction of
meaning in mathematical texts as well, it rests purely
semantic; it establishes an analogy between the mean-
ing construction of literary and mathematical text, but
it does not in itself enable contact with the specifics
(or, more plainly, the obvious differences) between
these. In short, the notion of metaphor would be much
more powerful if associated with a firm theory of the
linguistic specifics of such texts. Furthermore, the field
of structural linguistics seems a quite obvious place
to start, given its resonance with mathematics. This
certainly does not imply that we are to restrict our
investigation of mathematical text to their form but
that our main goal, to describe the nature of their
meanings, is better served when enlightened by a
natural theory of the nature of their form. I believe
we are here at a crucial intersection of the argument;
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the question is, why not just bypass all this formal
business and stick with pragmatic analysis of how
thoughts are exchanged, regardless of well-
formedness? Because in doing so, we bypass what
makes mathematical communication both special and
possible. The point is made as follows, in the context
of grammar in natural language, by Moravcsik (1976):
There is no thinking without rules. Both logic and
grammar conspire to make it possible for us to articu-
late thoughts. It is absurd to think of rules as restrict-
ing thinking; rules of coherence, consistency, and
grammaticality are what makes thinking possible. An
analogy with games like chess should make this
clear...The very possibility of playing chess is given
by the fact that the game is defined in terms of
rules...Learning and following rules...enhance our
lives and enable us to be free to participate in a large
number of activities.
Indeed, it is obvious that mathematical texts conform
to strict formal rules in the sense of structural gram-
mar: apart from symbol strings, the text consists of
phrases of natural language which are constructed
more or less as in other natu-
ral language texts; the sym-
bolic parts are also highly
regulated, although not ac-
cording to usual linguistic
principles. The interplay be-
tween symbol language and
natural language is complex
but clearly also crucial to the
meaning of the text both at sentence level and at dis-
course level. A systematic yet still somewhat sketchy
description of this interplay, from the point of view of
structural grammar and discourse analysis, is given
in (Winslow, 1998, Sec. 3) and (Winslow, 1999, Sec. 6).
The latter reference also discusses the relation to
Chomsky’s view of linguistic knowledge. We can sum-
marize the main results as follows:
Mathematical texts contain a certain regulated mix-
ture of natural language and symbol languages (the
latter including figures of geometric nature). At the
first level, the syntax of the text is that of natural lan-
guage, with certain phrase elements (e.g., a noun-
phrase) replaced by symbol strings (e.g., an equation).
Then, at the second level, the symbol strings have their
own (universal and context-bound) syntax, which in-
teracts systematically with the natural language syn-
tax of the first level, e.g. in regulating “replacement.”
We may describe the communicated realm of math-
ematical texts by the specific language use they rep-
resent, i.e. as a family of linguistic registers. This de-
scription includes the syntactic observations men-
tioned above, but also certain patterns of discursive
practice which are closely linked to the syntactic phe-
nomenon of transformations. An analytic tool in the
analysis of discourse in mathematical registers is the
notion of ensemble, which is a dynamic structure of
textual information around which the discourse is
centered.
As in the case of natural language, the complexity of
mathematical language use forces us to accept that
human competency in this domain has a non-void (in-
nate) “initial state.”
Metamathematical questions, delimited as in this sec-
tion, address the nature of mathematical knowledge
as evidenced by performance, i.e. from communica-
tion among human beings; this knowledge consists
roughly of communicating
competency (analogous to
knowledge of a natural lan-
guage) and factual knowl-
edge (a finite number of
sentences believed on lin-
guistic evidence to be true).
Notice that it is the latter,
finitary part of mathemati-
cal knowledge which has often been in focus of philo-
sophical studies; for us, they are the trivial part, and
may in principle be considered lexical material. None
of the traditional problems are swept under the car-
pet this way, because the evidence underlying this
material, as well as the individual’s belief of it, is
highly dependent on communicative competency. Yet
there is a shift of emphasis, well in line with math-
ematical practice: understanding a proof is mainly a
question of realizing certain transformations as accept-
able to the grammar of mathematical language use.
The context is built up using, but not itself constitut-
ing, the register. Thus, as with natural language, the
(extended) lexicon is occasionally revised during dis-
course practise. The elementary logical basis of math-
ematical reasoning another traditional source of con-
troversy is then viewed as an integrated part of hu-
man language capacity, much in the Wittgensteinian
❝Understanding a proof is mainly a question of
realizing certain transformations as acceptable to
the grammar of mathematical language use.
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sense of rule following as a condition to engage in
meaningful language acts.
6. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE KNOWING AND THE TEAMING OF
MATHEMATICS
In any domain, theories of knowledge and theories of
learning interact. In everyday language, learning is a
process towards or between states of knowing; a
(problematic) mathematical metaphor could be a func-
tion of time (representing knowledge) and its deriva-
tive (representing learning). The problem with team-
ing mathematics (and language, an analogy to which
we return in Sec. 6) is that it is not an accumulative
process which is easy to test in the function picture;
we are talking of a function with no obvious range
and means for evaluation (this, then, applies to the
derivative as well!), and it is definitely not a process
which may reach a final “perfect” state. Apart from
the most trivial kinds of recitative knowledge, such
as knowing the multiplication table from 2 to 10, it
does not really help to restrict or specify our attention
to certain domains of mathematical knowledge.
It is also clear that there is no easy relation between
metamathematics and mathematics education, under-
stood as the theory and practice of learning and teach-
ing mathematics. As Ernest (1991) rightly points out,
we are talking here of resonances rather than logical
implications between theories of knowledge and
learning. In particular, the function image is also false
in suggesting that the latter are derivatives of the first
in any sense. All too often, educators have been more
or less explicitly drawing links between false dichoto-
mies of (what they conceive of as) “good” vs. “bad”
views of knowing and learning mathematics, often as
a circular justification of the “good” views.
How are we to proceed, if we are nevertheless sus-
taining that substantial links exist? I believe a key is
to realize that, in fact, knowing and learning math-
ematics are not separable phenomena; acceptable
signs that an individual “knows” mathematics (his
“performance”) will in all interesting cases consist in
the production rather than reproduction of math-
ematical text, hence involve an element of self-induced
learning on the part of the knowing individual. To
see how a disciplinary distinction may then be sus-
tained, we have to further graduate the rough defini-
tion of mathematics education given above, to com-
prise at least three main layers, each with plenty of
room between them:
a) Mathematics acquisition (theories about the uni-
versal aspects of individual mathematics learning)
b) Didactics of mathematics (inquiry into how indi-
viduals may support learning of other individu-
als)
c) Methodology of mathematics teaching (concrete
methods of didactics implementation in a specific
context of contents, age group etc.).
It is clear that these three are also closely interacting
in practice, but at least the traditional tension between
theory (ranging from philosophy to psychology) and
implementation (such as classroom teaching) can now
be located as the span from a) to c), the former being
the main site of interaction with metamathematics. In
(Winslow, 1999) I have given an example of how
metamathematics and a) interact, in particular how
Chomsky’s version of Plato’s problem arises and may
be approached in ways similar to what is found in
linguistics models (of initial states and so on).
7. SOCIOLINGUISTICS, LANGUAGE PEDAGOGY, AND
MATHEMATICS EDUCATION
There are two senses in which language theory may
occur in mathematics education research. The first is
related to natural language use in mathematics teach-
ing, the second to mathematical language use as a
central aim, and often also difficulty, of learning. In
classroom discourse, one may typically find a maze
of intertwining phenomena related to these two cat-
egories, but it is seems clear to me that to study the
first without the second (that is, completely neglect-
ing the linguistic specifics of the subject matter taught)
is not a task for mathematics education, but rather for
general educational discourse analysis. By now, there
is an abundance of studies (not to speak of collected
data) regarding communication in mathematics class-
rooms, and I think it is fair to say that few of these are
explicitly grounded in coherent theories of both math-
ematical and natural language discourse. Because of
the complexity of mathematics classroom discourse,
in particular the delicate mixture of registers, only
parts of which are mathematical, this leads to a situa-
tion where the results of research become incommen-
surable analyses of special cases, with reproducibil-
ity in other contexts far out of sight. Notice that this is
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not meant as a critique or denial of the value of those
works; indeed, in a pre-paradigmatic phase, such a
situation is an inevitable and even necessary step to-
wards the formation of coherent research programs.
A perspective suggested by our discussion is the po-
tential parallels between mathematics education and
language education, and furthermore the necessity of
making this explicit has so far been almost completely
ignored in the study of linguistic aspects of mathemat-
ics education. The following are quite obvious do-
mains of inquiry in which this parallel can be pur-
sued:
How does knowledge of grammar behind “known
language” uses (natural language mother tongue as
well as known mathematics) affect learning of the new
“grammar” (of mathematical language use)? Research
partially along this line may be found e.g. in
(UNESCO, 1974) and (Saxe, 1988).
In what ways does mathematical discourse compe-
tency develop from other forms of discourse in math-
ematics learning environments? See e.g. (Pimm, 1994)
and (Sfard, 1998).
What are the roles of “learner factors” (such as affec-
tive factors, maturity factors and aptitude, cf. (Stern,
1983)), as studied in language education, in the learn-
ing of mathematical language use? This parallel is
discussed e.g. in (Winslow, 1998, Sec. 4.3.2) and, at a
much larger scale, in (Clarkson and Ellerton, 1996).
What diagnostic teaching forms (including tests) can
be used to address particular language-related
troubles in the learning process? This issue also has
affinities with recent neuro-psychological research on
the cognitive structures behind linguistic and numeri-
cal activity (Dehaene, 1997).
Are there mathematics-specific language disabilities,
and how are they related to the classical types of (natu-
ral) language disorder? Research along this line may
be found e.g. in (Donlan and Hutt, 1991), cf. also
(Stubbs, 1986, Chap. 10) for background on “conver-
sation disorders.”
For all of these (and similar) points, it should be ac-
knowledged that additional complexity (and, presum-
ably, difficulty) arises in learning which is meant to
include mixed discourse abilities, that is, the under-
standing and production of text in which mathemati-
cal language use occurs in contexts other than “pure
mathematics,” that is, in applied contexts. This, on the
other hand, also parallels obvious issues in foreign
language teaching, which is seldomly restricted to
technical acquisition of the language (but includes also
e.g. cultural and literary elements).
8. THE GRAND PICTURE AND THE NEED FOR IT
Viewing the preceding sections separately, I hope to
have given the reader an impression of the deep links
between the study of natural language structure on
the one side, and the study of mathematics as a do-
main of knowledge on the other side. Both come in
three more or less consecutive layers: the field itself,
its metaaspects and its learning. Putting them together
and drawing the flows of intellectual current which
were described, we arrive at the diagram of Figure 1.
It is important to note that not all arrows have the
same status at present; especially the downward ar-
rows are only now appearing in tentative ways, and
as mentioned in the introduction, these ways are par-
tially incompatible if not incommensurable.
The question is now: to what extent do these flows
add up to a coherent picture? And, even more impor-
tantly: to which extent could and should they? By co-
herence, I do not mean strict commutativity in the
STRUCTURAL
LINGUISTICS
SOCIO-
LINGUISTICS
LANGUAGE
PEDAGOGY
MATHEMATICS META-
MATHEMATICS
MATHEMATICS
EDUCATION
Figure 1
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mathematical (mapping) sense, but rather that the
flows are conceived as coordinated around each of
the four triangles, representing (from the left): the in-
fluence of mathematics on metamathematics and lin-
guistics, metatheories inspired by linguistics, the uses
of sociolinguist perspectives in metamathematics and
mathematics education, and the (emanating) flow of
ideas from sociolinguistics through language peda-
gogy to the theory and practice of mathematics edu-
cation.
I will close this note by sketching my main arguments
that coherence is crucial for these interactions to play
a significant role in metamathematics and mathemat-
ics education. First, assuming that our inquiry ad-
dresses issues (epistemology, foundations, etc.) which
are specific to mathematics, it is evidently important
that mathematics is in a substantial way taken into
consideration. If we are to make the case that language
type phenomena are, in a non-superficial way, crucial
for these issues, then mathematics itself must be ac-
commodated in our framework from the outset. This
particularly concerns the left triangle of Figure 1, with-
out which the rest has no direct link back to math-
ematics (this is to a large extent the case in much of
the current relevant literature).
A crucial issue is the role of conversation in the learn-
ing and creation of mathematical knowledge (cf. e.g.
Ernest, 1998). Here, of course, mathematics is taken
into consideration, but usually only through (a few)
specific historical instances. This is highly unsatisfac-
tory if one is interested in the general case, but in the
absence of a coherent and general linguistic theory of
mathematical language use, there is no better option.
This is why we are forced to substantially involve the
apparatus of modem linguistics. Interdisciplinarity is
obviously a necessity for the study of relations be-
tween as disparate domains of inquiry as dealt with
here. Because of the traditions of professional train-
ing, few if any agents in the research communities will
be experts in each of the six participating fields. The
result of having no consensus or common overall per-
spective may be a wealth of bidisciplinary efforts, in
which important input from other parts of the pat-
tern is ignored.
On the other hand, a coherent understanding of
interdisciplinarity in this area may lead to a new type
of professionalism. This phenomenon is well known
for bidisciplinary work, as the examples discussed in
Sec. 1. My vision for the linguistic study of aspects of
mathematics is exactly that this could be the case for
the six-discipline interaction mapped out in Fig. 1,
engaging mathematicians, linguists, philosophers of
mathematics etc. and particularly “combinations”
thereof in an explicitly articulated enterprise. If lan-
guage use in mathematics is subject to defining rules
of linguistic nature, then this enterprise is essential
for our understanding and dissemination of math-
ematical knowledge.
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“As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are
not certain; as far as they are certain, they do not refer to
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--Albert Einstein
